Ron Miller is an attorney who focuses on serious injury and wrongful death cases involving motor vehicle collisions, medical malpractice, and products and premises liability. If you are looking for a Maryland personal injury attorney for your case, call him today at 800-553-8082.

Nora Freeman Engstrom writes an amazing article for the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics titled Run-of-the-Mill Justice. She writes about settlement mill law firms, writing with a 60 Minutes investigative journalism style that names names, calling out a few law firms she has labeled as settlement mill firms. Engstrom characterizes these firms as “characterized by their high claim volume, aggressive advertising, significant delegation to non-attorneys, entrepreneurial focus, and quick resolution of claims, typically without initiation of suit.”

There are about 10 different facets of the article I find interesting. I found of particular interest the idea that settlement mills create a “one size fits all” (my words, not hers) kind of justice. Under this system, individualized pain and suffering does not exist for settlement purposes.

car accident settlementWhat matters for car accident settlement purposes in non-serious injury cases is the amount of the medical bills, what the injuries are, and how much damage they did to the vehicles. Plaintiffs’ car accident lawyers have blamed this on a paradigm shift in the thinking of insurance companies in the 90s, This article argues, convincingly, that many plaintiffs’ lawyers are unindicted co-conspirators in this system.

I will be speaking to the North Carolina Advocates for Justice in Greensboro on Friday, December 11th on maximizing the value of personal injury claims and the related issue of dealing with insurance companies.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals decided Romero v. Brenes yesterday. This case involved a single-car accident that killed both passenger and driver. A Montgomery County trial court granted the Defendant’s attorney’s motion for judgment at the close of the passenger’s wrongful death case because the trial judge found that the evidence did not establish that the negligence of the driver was a proximate cause of the fatal crash.

Defendant’s argument was essentially “hey, no one saw this accident so no one knows what happened.” Most of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals found a jury could have found that the unexplained loss of control by the driver and the driver’s excessive speed was the proximate cause of this fatal car accident. Continue reading

Whenever I prepare for giving an opening statement, as I am today, my head is filled with more advice that I have heard or read over the years than expletives Bill Belichick threw out last night. I am writing today about two issues: what you should wear to trial and how you begin your opening.

The conventional advice from noted trial advocacy authors I have read and respect, such as Thomas Mauet and David Ball, is to leave the Rolex at home. This literal advice includes its corollaries of dressing conservatively in a blue or black suit that you did not buy in Italy, no necklaces or bracelets, etc.

This is the conventional wisdom, and I buy into a part of the premise. Jurors will prefer trial lawyers they can relate to, and many of us do not relate to the guy with the Craig Sager suit jacket. But I think what really creates a disconnect between a trial lawyer and a jury is when the lawyer is not perceived as authentic. Any time you are stepping out of your box, you will be less comfortable in your own skin. Juries are people: they sense this like a shark senses blood.

Accident lawyers attempting to negotiate settlements with insurance companies view insurance companies as monolithic, i.e., “Insurance Company A is difficult’ or “Insurance Company B is easy to deal with on claims.”

Sure, it is an oversimplification. Claims practices by different insurance companies vary from state to state and even from insurance claims adjuster to insurance claims adjuster. But each insurance company has its own history, policies, and “world view” of handling auto accident claims.  There are some insurance companies — Progressive and MAIF come to mind first — that you can safely bet you have no chance of getting anything resembling a fair offer.

It is also worth noting that the similarities of individual insurance companies vary inversely with the severity of the accident. This is because larger cases invariably require more discretion by the insurance adjuster, and serious injury cases are given to more experienced adjusters who are given more trust from the insurance company.

While not as fun as, say, baseball statistics in the pre-steroids era, I really enjoy looking at statistics on personal injury lawsuits. The Department of Justice just released a new report on personal injury lawsuit statistics (which I found via TortsProfBlog). The data, as always with this stuff, is older – 2005. But it is still interesting. Here is a sampling:

  • Personal injury lawsuits accounted for about 60% of the estimated 26,948 tort, contract, and real property cases. The big venues are trying fewer cases. The number of personal injury lawsuits conducted by state courts in our 75 most populated counties declined approximately a third from 10,278 trials in 1996 to 7,038 trials in 2005.
  • Verdicts are down a bit, but not much is changing. The median damage awards garnered by plaintiffs in personal injury lawsuits declined from $38,000 in 1996 to $31,000 in 2005. Personal injury plaintiffs prevailed from 1996 to 2005 consistently about half of the time. The percentage of plaintiffs prevailing in automobile accident cases increased a bit from 58% in 1996 to 61% in 2005, but medical malpractice lawsuits became less successful: medical malpractice plaintiffs won in 19% of malpractice lawsuits in 2005 and 23% in 1996.
  • Nearly 60% of tort trials were auto accident lawsuits. Wow.
  • Approximately 15% of tort trials were medical malpractice lawsuits. It takes six days to try the average malpractice lawsuit.
  • Approximately 5% of tort trials were product liability lawsuits. Of the product liability lawsuits that went to trial, plaintiffs prevailed in about 40%.
  • An amazing 25% of product liability lawsuits are asbestos claims or other toxic tort lawsuits.
  • Judges found for plaintiffs in 56% of tort trials, while juries ruled in favor of plaintiffs in 51% of tort trials.
  • Plaintiffs prevailed in less than a quarter of lawsuits involving medical malpractice, non-asbestos (other) product liability, and false arrest or imprisonment trials.
  • During 2005, plaintiff winners in tort trials in the national sample were awarded an estimated
    $3.6 billion in compensatory and punitive damages (not shown in a table). The overall median final award of $24,000 in jury trials and $21,000 in bench trials did not differ statistically.

Continue reading

Sean Wajert’s MassTort Defense Blog (c/o Torts Prof Blog) has an interesting post on a new opinion by the Iowa Supreme Court on whether you can admit subsequent remedial measures in cases that sound both in negligence and strict liability.

The Iowa court found that Plaintiff’s design defect and failure-to-warn claims involving the jack pin used on a boat trailer sound in negligence, rather than strict liability. Interpreting an Iowa law that, like Maryland’s law, is substantially similar to Federal Rule 407, the court held that Rule 5.407’s carve-out for strict liability in tort and breach of warranty claims does not apply to designed defect claims, but is intended only for product liability claims alleging a manufacturing defect.

Mr. Wajert supports the court’s holding in his blog post:

Medical malpractice lawyers, victims’ advocacy groups, doctors (and their lobbyists), and insurance companies have produced a heretofore unprecedented spate of editorials on medical malpractice reform in the last few months. Even I’m bored with it.

But a recent editorial in Salon is a little different because the message—that medical malpractice tort reform is not the answer—comes from a pediatrician. The doctor methodically and concisely attacks the premises behind the tort reform movement, including the idea that there is a pandemic of frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits:

Instead of a swamp of frivolous lawsuits, what the data shows is a system that functions. Insubstantial claims tend to collapse, while the medical industry usually opts to pay off injured patients instead of going to trial. The doctors and the insurers choose to fight to win when they think they can, and when there is enough money at stake, and usually do win.

This morning I blogged about University of Maryland Medical Systems v. Waldt in one of the longest posts in Maryland Injury Law Center history. Apparently, considering my blog post and the criticisms in the post, the Maryland Court of Appeals withdrew the opinion. (Okay, maybe it did not happen quite that way. But allow me to pretend.)

What does this mean? I have no idea. The Maryland high court substantively changed its opinion a few years back in Erie v. Heffernan on the question of the impact of insurance companies waiving subrogation in uninsured motorist claims. But the court reaffirmed the deleted portions of the opinion in Heffernan in Maurer v. Pennsylvania National. I’m still perplexed by the thinking on all of that to this day. I’m sure there was a logical reason. But the Maryland Court of Appeals does not share its thinking on these things.

Anyway, the Vegas odds are that this means nothing of great substance. I doubt one of the four judges in the majority will flip and join the dissent to make a majority. The changes could just be trivial. But anything is possible and we will have to wait and see.

The Maryland Court of Appeals reached a decision in University of Maryland Medical System v. Waldt, a case that is reverberating among medical malpractice lawyers in Maryland. (Note: In yet another incredible turn, the Maryland high court has – temporarily at least – withdrawn this opinion.) Yet the back story is better than the case. Two of the most prolific lawyers in Maryland’s history tried this case: Steve Snyder and Billy Murphy. As discussed below, Steve Snyder said he would retire if he lost this case on appeal. (I think he will get a takey-backsie on this one.) In the trial, the Baltimore City judge that tried the case had to give this admonition:

“This is it. Last warning to everybody,” she said. “No finger-pointing, children. No stomping your feet. No screaming. No yelling. No dancing around. No calling names. No throwing sticks and stones. No putting gum in each other’s hair.”

So it got out of control. (More on that later.) But this opinion is important; the underlying trial was an epic and personal war, and Maryland malpractice law is much more clear or an abyss of confusion, depending upon who you ask. While you take a breath, let’s talk about the facts.

This is the tragic case of a Mount Airy woman who was paralyzed on her left side as the result of an operation to treat a brain aneurysm. Plaintiff underwent a procedure at the University of Maryland Hospital to treat an aneurysm which caused bleeding that lead to her injuries, according to the evidence offered by Plaintiff’s attorney at trial.

At trial, Plaintiff called an expert to offer opinions both on the standard of care and on informed consent. The trial judge, Baltimore City Circuit Court Judge Lynn Stewart, excluded the expert’s testimony because the expert devoted over 20% of his professional activities to activities that directly involve testimony in personal injury claims. (Maryland law requires malpractice experts to spend less than 20% of their time in medical malpractice or other personal injury cases.) Because this was the Plaintiff’s only expert, the court directed judgment in favor of the Defendants.

The expert was not just some random guy. He held positions at Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard, and John Hopkins. The doctor was also not caught up in the medical malpractice testifying racket: he made less than $50,000 a year. He had not, however, seen patients since 2001 and was no longer licensed to practice medicine in the United States. Interestingly, he said he had a medical license in France, but only to write prescriptions for family members. His professional activities included conducting literature peer reviews, reading journals, observing procedures, and discussing patients with former colleagues. His testimony at trial:

Murphy: Now, you testified that you no longer practice medicine but you handle cases for plaintiffs’ lawyers who are suing others for malpractice?

Expert: Yes.

Murphy: That’s all you basically do now except for read journals and go to an occasional meeting, right?

Expert: Yes.

Murphy: So, you are a professional witness, sir, aren’t you?

Slutkin: Objection, your honor.

Judge: Overruled.

Murphy: You are a professional witness, aren’t you, sir?

Expert: I guess I am.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals disagreed that the expert should be disqualified, finding that the evidence showed that the expert did not violate the 20% rule. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed and affirmed the judgment.

(Brief intermission: technically, it is the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland and the Court of Appeals of Maryland. But I think it sounds funny.) Continue reading

Contact Information